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THE ROLE OF THE CLIENT: THE 
PRESIDENT’S ROLE IN GOVERNMENT 
LAWYERING 
Gabriella Blum*
Abstract: Discussions of whether Bush and Clinton administration lawyers 
have acted ethically have missed a fundamental point about the attorney-
client relationship. It is the client—in this case, the government—who is 
ultimately responsible for making policy decisions, not the attorney. Too 
often, the question of what is “legal” has been substituted for what should 
actually be done, especially in the United States, where “legal” and 
“desirable” have become so intertwined. Governments should consult with 
attorneys, but should also be prepared to implement whatever policies 
they believe are “right,” and if necessary to explain any departures from 
what is “legal” to the pubic, to whom they are ultimately accountable. 
 The public debate over the ethical and professional conduct of the 
Bush administration lawyers has been a hallmark of the critique of the 
Bush presidency in its entirety. John Yoo, Alberto Gonzales, James 
Bybee, David Addington and others have consistently drawn fire on all 
fronts; after a while, it seemed their actions stood as a metonymy for 
the administration in general. By their critics they were held respon-
sible for everything the administration was doing and, worse still, were 
perceived as aiders and abettors rather than gatekeepers, who should 
thus be indicted for complicity in the administration’s perpetration of 
war crimes. 
 The mere fact that the debate over the lawyers’ conduct has 
corresponded to such a large degree with the debate over the Bush 
administration’s policies in the war on terrorism is proof of the point 
I wish to make here: much of the assessment of the lawyers’ handling 
of their tasks assumes a direct and inevitable relationship between the 
legal advice provided and the administration’s subsequent actions. 
This assumption has not been sufficiently examined. In other words, 
the voluminous discussions of the role of government lawyers have 
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largely neglected an inquiry into the role of the client, and, by exten-
sion, the role of law in policymaking. 
 To sieze the point, it would be useful to turn to Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey’s Commencement speech at Boston College Law 
School last year.1 Like others who have attempted to account for the 
state of public legal practice under the Bush administration, the Attor-
ney General claimed that any discussion of the conduct of the admin-
istration lawyers must begin with their predecessors under President 
Clinton. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (9/11 Commission) placed direct blame on the lawyers 
of the Clinton administration for preventing the Executive from taking 
effective action to meet the threat of terrorism against the United 
States. According to the report, the Clinton lawyers were too risk-averse, 
refrained from “going right up to the edge of the law,” and actively 
hindered the Executive from exercising even those powers that should 
have been deemed legal under a more security-minded reading of the 
law.2 In this, the government lawyers shared the responsibility for the 
government’s failure to preempt the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Attorney General Mukasey then explained that it was this criticism that 
invited, indeed drove, the subsequent Bush administration lawyers to 
interpret the law in the most expansive way possible (and, to many 
minds, impossible). 
 If we accept this narrative, we have before us two groups: those 
pre-9/11 lawyers who advised the government that it could not do what 
it believed was necessary to fight terrorism, and those post-9/11 lawyers 
who advised the government that it could do whatever it thought was 
necessary to fight terrorism. One group limited the President more 
than was legally required; the other allowed him more than was legally 
plausible. 
 This discrepancy immediately begs a series of questions: where 
do we draw the correct line between complicity and obstruction? 
What considerations should lawyers take into account when offering 
legal advice to the executive? And, if such advice must be tipped one 
way or another, what type of bias should our system prefer—the 
overly-permissive or overly-restrictive? 
                                                                                                                      
1 See generally Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 179 (2009). 
2 See generally Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States (2004), available at http://www.9–11commission.gov/report/ 
911Report.pdf 
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 Past and present debates over the role of government lawyers 
tend to focus on the type of legal advice with which public-service 
lawyers should furnish their clients. Some, like Jack Balkin, have made 
the cheerless sophist argument that, “lawyers are rhetorical whores; 
their job is to confuse, obfuscate, and make unjust and illegal things 
seem perfectly just and legal, or, if they cannot quite manage that feat, 
to muddy up our convictions sufficiently that we conclude that it’s a 
close case.”3 Almost thirty years earlier, Geoffrey Hazard opined that, 
“If you have a client, you have to represent him and not ‘justice’ in 
some abstract sense.”4 Others, such as David Luban and Deborah 
Rhode, have professed an altogether different view of what lawyering, 
and particularly government lawyering, should be about, arguing that 
public service lawyers should care, “more about the means used than 
the bare fact that they are legal,”5 and, “accept personal responsibility 
for the moral consequences of their professional actions.”6
 To my mind, these debates neglect an all-important component, 
which is the role of the government as a client. More specifically, I wish 
to argue that the question of what type of advice lawyers should give the 
government concerns only one part of a two-way conversation between 
the lawyer and the client; and that without inquiring into the responsi-
bility of the client receiving the legal advice, our normative and pre-
scriptive view of government lawyering is seriously lacking. 
 To flesh out my argument, I return to a paragraph in Attorney 
General Mukasey’s speech: 
A lawyer’s principal duty is to advise his client as to the best 
reading of the law—to define the space in which the client 
may legally act. If you do your job well, there will be times 
when you will advise clients that the law prohibits them from 
taking their desired course of action, or even prohibits them 
from doing things that are, in your view, the right thing to 
do. And there will be times when you will have to advise cli-
ents that the law permits them to take actions that you may 
find imprudent, or even wrong.7
                                                                                                                      
3 Jack M. Balkin, Our Legal and Political Culture, Balkinization, Dec. 31, 2005, http:// 
balkin.blogspot.com/2005/12/our-legal-and-political-culture.html. 
4 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 125 (1978). 
5 David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study, at xxii (1988). 
6 Deborah Rhode, In the Interests of Justice 66–67 (2000). 
7 Mukasey, supra note 1, at 180. 
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Attorney General Mukasey suggests that the lawyer’s task is limited to 
a pronunciation of what the law is, consciously excluding any extra-
legal considerations. For now, I wish to sidestep the debate about 
whether this statement is correct or not, and focus, instead, on what 
Attorney General Mukasey does not say—about what the client should 
do with the legal advice he receives. His silence on this point, I 
believe, derives from an implicit assumption, which pervades the 
government as much as it does public discourse, that legal advice is 
forever an overriding consideration, the last if not the first argument 
to be weighed in any policy discussion. 
 In the United States, as Thomas Paine has said, “Law is King.”8 
From its earliest foundation, this country has taken pride in being a 
nation ruled not by men but by laws.9 Alexis de Tocqueville com-
mended the role of law in the United States as mitigating against 
majority tyranny.10 The notion of a rule of law, to which the leaders as 
much as any common citizen are subject, underlies our fundamental 
political association. The Constitution is our new Bible, our laws are 
our common pact. The American ideal of a city upon a hill has 
become dependent on following the wise restraints that keep us free. 
In everyday discourse we commend people for being law abiding 
citizens, and believe that everyone should “play by the rules.” For 
Americans, both past and present, the law is a metonymy for the line 
that separates right from wrong, inviting wrongdoers to justify their 
immoral behavior by arguing they have done nothing illegal, and 
making it difficult to justify illegal behavior as nonetheless morally 
just. 
 In this uber-legalistic culture, if a lawyer advises her client that a 
policy is illegal, the client hears “it is evil.” No one wants to be an evil-
doer. If she advises her client that the policy is legal, the client hears “it 
is good,” because it is compatible with the system of values on which we 
have chosen to found the law. If it is “good,” it follows that doing it is 
also worthwhile. Hence, we arrive at a confluence of legality and 
legitimacy, of what is permissible and what is desirable, a confluence 
which is often questionable both pragmatically and ethically. 
 Administrations are not immune to this conflation; in some ways 
they are more susceptible to it. In the context of the war on terrorism, 
                                                                                                                      
8 Thomas Paine, Common Sense 56 (W. and T. Bradford 1791) (1776). 
9 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
10 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Causes Which Mitigate the Tyranny of the Majority in the 
United States, in Democracy in America 348–58 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve trans., 
Sever and Francis 1899) (1862). 
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an administration that would not pursue an aggressive-but-lawful policy, 
a policy that some people in the government think could help fight our 
enemies, might be regarded with hindsight as incompetent or negli-
gent its duty to protect the country, especially if another attack 
ensued.11 A characterization of “lawful” thus becomes an order to act. 
If, however, the Executive chooses to pursue a legally-dubious strategy, 
one that it believes is necessary to protect the country, it assumes a 
hefty risk of not being able to justify its actions to a legally-minded 
public or to an international community holding an altogether 
different set of values and laws. 
 A concrete example of the effects of legality on the public’s 
evaluation of policies may be found in a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll 
conducted in January 2006, in which the public was asked to comment 
on the government’s wiretapping program (which was effected before 
congress amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)). 
The poll showed a near-perfect correlation between those who believed 
the program to be illegal under the existing FISA (49%) and those who 
believed the program to be wrong (50%). Respondents who believed 
the wiretapping program was probably legal (47%) corresponded to 
the number of people who replied to the question whether the pro-
gram was also right (47%).12
 In this kind of political climate, whether consciously or subcon-
sciously, an administration accords substantial, and perhaps exagger-
ated, deference to the legal advice it receives. The legal review of any 
proposed policy becomes the make or break point of pursuing it. The 
result is that lawyers do not just give legal advice; their advice is what 
effectively determines government policy. The collapse of legal advice 
into strategy has been previously described by the former head of the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Jack Goldsmith: 
This is why the question “what should we do?” so often collap-
sed into the question “what can we lawfully do?” . . . It is why 
there was so much pressure to act to the edges of the law. And 
it is why what the lawyers said about where those edges were 
ended up defining the contours of the policy.13
                                                                                                                      
11 See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the 
Bush Administration 130–31 (2007). 
12 Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Remains Divided About Wiretapping Controversy, Gallup Poll, 
Feb. 16, 2006, http://galluppoll.com/content/?ci=21499. 
13 Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 131. 
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 Why is this collapse so troubling? Laws may be the first formal 
indicator we turn to in order to distinguish right from wrong. Both 
domestically and internationally, laws are enacted to anchor certain 
values and interests that their legislatures believe are right and just. 
But on a more fundamental level, we do not generally believe that law 
can or should exhaust our deliberation of right and wrong. Both 
morally and pragmatically, it is an imperfect marker. We may find an 
action  condemnable even when there is no law against it: A person 
who walks by a drowning child and makes no effort to save him even 
at little risk to himself is reprehensible, even though only few states 
have bad Samaritan laws. In the same vein, we sometimes commend 
people (before or after the fact) for acting in violation of the law. The 
legacy of Rosa Parks offers a constant reminder that our notions of 
justice versus law are not always commensurate. In fact, the necessity 
defense in criminal law (which is not unique to U.S. law) is grounded 
in the notion that some instances of law-breaking are morally justifi-
able. 
 In the context of the war on terror, specifically, it may be that a 
particular act is unlawful, but should nevertheless be pursued. Numer-
ous commentators have expressed support for the idea that the 
President should be allowed to employ coercive means—even torture— 
in the rare ticking-bomb case, even though the legal prohibition on 
torture is clear and absolute. In contrast, some coercive means that fall 
short of torture, and would therefore be lawful, may actually prove 
ineffective in the vast majority of interrogations of suspected terrorists.14
 It may equally come to pass, that an unquestionably legal act 
would be nonetheless better abstained from. The U.S. military’s 
newly-revised Counter-Insurgency Manual warns against the strategic 
fallout from inflicting civilian casualties in the course of counter-
insurgency operations, even though the laws of war do not prescribe a 
zero-casualty obligation.15 It is the obligation of the Executive to 
weigh the strategic, moral, and political implications of civilian 
casualties, even if the military operations that inflict them fall within 
the scope of the law. Contrary to political rhetoric, governments 
should not do everything to protect their citizens in the literal sense, 
but only those things that are actually effective and that make ethical 
and practical sense. 
                                                                                                                      
14 On the merits and pitfalls of coercive interrogations, see generally Matthew Alexan-
der, I’m Still Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 2008, at B01. 
15 See generally Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 (“Counterinsurgency”) (2006). 
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 The authority we vest in the President comes with the expectation 
that the President will exercise his best judgment and take respon-
sibility for his actions when necessary. If President Clinton or his aides 
truly believed that employing more aggressive methods were necessary 
to combat the threat of terrorism, the President should have ordered 
these methods, or acted to change the law, even if his lawyers wavered 
on the legal implications of such an order. He should then have been 
ready and willing to justify his actions to the American public, whose 
reaction would have undoubtedly depended on its perception of the 
magnitude of the threat and the appropriate emergency responses. 
Indeed, public criticism of what some argued was President Clinton’s 
inaction grew much stronger after the September 11 attacks; public 
criticism of President Bush increased as threats of additional attacks 
remained unfulfilled. This is the political calculus the government must 
take into account in deciding how to react to a perceived threat; it 
would be irresponsible leadership to avoid any political ramifications by 
making law—and lawyers—the ultimate decision-makers. 
 Whether justified or not, there was a real fear within the Bush ad-
ministration of the legal ramifications from an admission of breaking 
the law. True, historically, the number of prosecutions of executive 
officials in cases implicating national security is very low. Indeed, 
Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and his 
dismissal of the courts’ overruling of the suspension during the Civil 
War is generally lauded, not condemned. Moreover, for present-day 
practical purposes, in two separate acts—the Detainee Treatment Act 
and the Military Commissions Act—Congress has ensured immunity 
for officials from criminal liability. Other sources of immunity protect 
government and military officials from liability under civil lawsuits. 
The likelihood of anyone who followed government orders in the 
course of the war on terrorism actually being held to account in any 
U.S. court is remote. 
 Nevertheless, there are growing calls for the indictment of Bush 
administration officials for war crimes, calls that have intensified 
following a bipartisan report by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that tied Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his legal counsel, Will-
iam J. Haynes, Gonzales and Addington to the torture and abuse of 
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prisoners.16 Whether or not indictments are ultimately made, there are 
associated costs (reputation, counsel fees, etc.) that are very real. 
 The threat of indictment in a foreign court under a paradigm of 
universal jurisdiction is even greater.17 To date, lawsuits filed against 
Rumsfeld, former Central Intelligence Agency director George Tenet, 
high ranking military officers, and several former government lawyers 
in Germany, France, and elsewhere, alleging torture and war crimes at 
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, have not materialized into any real 
action against those cited. After all, the United States is far better able 
to protect its officials from such proceedings than other countries 
who face similar risks.18 The threat of indictment remains, however, 
and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, fearing arrest, did have to flee 
from France.19
 Real or not, however, the risks of either domestic or international 
chastising or indictment must be regarded as an occupational hazard 
that comes with holding office and exercising authority—a smaller 
risk than that assumed by any member of the U.S. armed forces 
deployed to a combat zone in the war on terror. It should not, as a 
normative matter, account for the transfer of responsibility from 
decision-makers to lawyers. 
 Naturally, when breaking the law is not an extraordinary and 
exceptional imperative, but a permanent or broad change of policy 
(such as wiretapping thousands of individuals), the executive should 
prefer a strategy of changing the law to violating the law. After the 
public uproar that ensued when the secret wiretapping program 
became known, the executive acted in concert with Congress to 
amend FISA to allow for more wiretapping within the law. Changing 
the law, however, is not always possible, nor is it always desirable. At 
times, amending the law would make a program public even though it 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detain-
ees in U.S. Custody, 110th Cong., at xiv–xix (2008), available at http://levin.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. 
17 See Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 
213, 222–24 (2008) (providing several examples of state leaders tried under universal ju-
risdiction doctrine by foreign states).
18 A threat to remove the NATO headquarters from Brussels quickly took care of an 
indictment against Bush in Belgium. See Paul Chevigny, The Limitations of Universal Jurisdic-
tion, Global Policy Forum, Mar. 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/opinion/ 
2006/03universal.htm. 
19 Twice, the German prosecutor has declined to commence a criminal investigation 
into complaints filed by human rights activists against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. See 
Mark Landler, Twelve Detainees Sue Rumsfeld in Germany, Citing Abuse, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 
2006, at A17. 
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is better kept secret for security reasons. Other times, such as in the 
case of torture, amending the law would normalize the exception, at a 
great loss to the normative and symbolic weight of the absolute 
prohibition. In all such cases, acting outside the law may be inevitable 
or preferable to amending the law so as to enable a lawful action. 
 Throughout the post-9/11 era, the dialogue between govern-
ment lawyers and the Bush administration over counterterrorism 
strategies has remained predominantly legalistic. In the now-infamous 
OLC memos that became public, the discussion of detention, coercive 
interrogations, and the war on terrorism more generally were limited 
to an analysis of executive power and the interpretation of domestic 
and international law. The President, who was fearful of the political 
implications of acting outside the law, sought approval from his 
lawyers prior to any action taken in the war on terrorism. The lawyers, 
who did not want to be accused of inhibiting the war on terrorism, 
became enablers of any and all strategies. Authorizing an un-
precedented expansion of executive power, dismissing international 
law as irrelevant, narrowly interpreting constraining domestic legis-
lation, and consciously and explicitly excluding any moral, political, 
or pragmatic considerations from their analysis, these lawyers believed 
they were acting in the best interest of national security in enabling 
the President’s strategies. Jack Goldsmith, although critical of the role 
played by some of the Bush administration lawyers, described his own 
sentiment while heading the OLC in a testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, quoting, with endorsement, George Tenet: “You 
simply could not sit where I did and read what passed across my desk 
on a daily basis and be anything other than scared to death about 
what it portended.”20 Once labeled merely “legal,” the more ag-
gressive strategies became more appealing as they grew to be “just” 
and “right,” and to some in the Bush administration, inevitable. 
 This dynamic proves that the problem did not lie exclusively with 
the lawyers, who believed, rightly or wrongly, that they were acting in 
the best interest of national security (albeit under an ideological com-
mitment to greater executive power). The problem lay instead in the 
type of dialogue that the administration conducted with its lawyers, 
according “law” near-absolute power as a determinant of policy. It is a 
derivative of the social, cultural, and political role of law in the United 
                                                                                                                      
20 Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Har-
vard Law School) available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id= 
2958&wit_id=6693 (quoting George Tenet, At The Center of the Storm 99 (2007)). 
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States; of its almost mythical power as a synonym for the distinction 
between right and wrong; and of the upper echelons in the govern-
ment seeking legal cover to function as political cover for their actions. 
It is also a derivative of over-zealous lawyers who sought to please their 
clients, and over-deferential courts that took only hesitant, incremental 
steps to assert the law in the face of the government. 
 Christopher Kutz eloquently described the difference in attitude 
towards law between Presidents Lincoln and Jefferson, on the one 
hand, and President Bush on the other: 
Certainly many Presidents in U.S. history have argued for, and 
acted upon, a presumption of extra-statutory authority. The 
most famous include Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana 
Territories, and Lincoln’s expansion of the Army and sus-
pension of habeas corpus. Both Presidents justified their acts by 
reference to public necessity. But, as Jules Lobel and Daniel 
Farber have argued, both also accepted the authority of the 
law they broke, making possible post-hoc congressional ratif-
ication and opening themselves to the legal consequences 
should that ratification not be forthcoming. In one sense, 
both Presidents justified their use of extra-judicial authority 
post hoc, by returning to the scene of their crimes, as it were, 
and looking for ratification. We must therefore be careful to 
distinguish claims regarding what must be done from what 
can actually be done under principles of justified authority 
. . . . [T]he Bush Administration took a different tack. Rather 
than concede the extra-legality of its positions, the OLC put 
forward a striking constitutional theory of presidential auth-
ority, which rendered even very general congressional limit-
ations on intelligence gathering themselves illegal infring-
ements of Executive prerogative.21
The ultimate responsibility for weighing right and wrong, beyond 
what a particular law at a particular time prescribes, lies with the 
government, not its lawyers. The government should break the law if 
it deems it right and necessary for the good of its citizens. It should 
also avoid lawful policies that are immoral, irresponsible, or counter-
productive. It is not the responsibility of the lawyers to make these 
                                                                                                                      
21 Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 235, 268 
(2007). 
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decisions. By having a conversation about “law,” all other consid-
erations became absorbed by and dissolved into the legal discourse. 
 The lawyer’s job is neither to give an administration a get-out-of-
jail-free card, nor to block national security policies that elected 
officials deem essential to protect the country. It is only to provide the 
executive with the best understanding of the legal boundaries per-
taining to any proposed action. Because of the view of law as a trump 
card in the decision-making process, however, it is also incumbent on 
the lawyer to remind the client that legal advice is just that and no 
more. Whatever the possible ramifications of violating the law at a 
given moment, it is the duty of the decision-maker to weigh those 
ramifications in the overall calculus of the proposed strategy. 
 The Bush administration lawyers did not do this. Instead, they 
felt they had to justify any government action under legal terms, for 
fear of tying the government’s hands. By doing so, they legalized 
illegal actions. They normalized and made routine the exceptional. 
“Clear and present danger” became every danger; remote possibilities 
turned into probable events; emergency became normalcy. This 
behavior did a great disservice not only to their clients, but to the rule 
of law. The source of this malpractice was not so much that lawyers 
did not perform their roles; it was, in the main, that they did not, or 
perhaps could not, trust their clients to perform their own role of 
governing. 
 It is possible that this failure to accord law its appropriate place 
may call for some institutional reforms in the government lawyer-
client relationship. Currently, the President and the cabinet members 
are the designated clients of the OLC,22 and some commentators have 
suggested that the correct view of the client must be the American 
people, not any particular official or decision-maker. Neal Katyal even 
proposed that many of the advisory functions of the OLC be turned 
over to an independent agency acting as an adjudicative body.23 Nina 
Pillared suggested a greater role for the Inspector General in the 
                                                                                                                      
22 According to the Department of Justice website, “By delegation from the Attorney 
General, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel provides 
authoritative legal advice to the President and all the Executive Branch agencies.” U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ (last visited Feb 3, 
2009). 
23 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2336–40 (2006). 
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Department of Justice.24 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have called 
for bipartisan appointments of lawyers to the OLC.25
 All of these proposals may be useful in distancing the clients from 
the lawyers, but none would resolve the underlying problem of both 
lawyers and presidents fearing the paralysis brought upon by an 
“illegal” characterization. If, as I believe, this problem derives from 
the social and cultural precedence of law in American political life, its 
only real remedy is courageous and wise leaders who would pick the 
right instances for breaking the law and be willing to defend their 
decisions. A modern Lincoln could restore law into its rightful place: 
an all-powerful, but not absolute, guide for action. 
 To conclude, several clarifications are in order. First, I do not 
mean to suggest that the Bush administration necessarily cared about 
the law; it is clear that it believed that the exigencies of the day called 
for extreme measures, whether perfectly legal or questionably so. It 
did, however, care about what it could say about the law. The law was 
twisted and turned so as to offer the administration the legal cover for 
its actions. The administration sought this cover believing that it could 
not publicly admit to breaking the law even in the name of security 
exigencies. The lawyers played along out of a similar understanding of 
the role of law in public opinion. 
 Second, I wish to emphasize that, contrary to other comment-
ators, my claim is not one of “too many lawyers.” I do not believe that 
lawyers should stay out of national security matters or refrain from 
commenting on the legal merits of contemplated policies, even when 
those touch on the core of the most sensitive security questions. Any 
time a policy or action raises legal questions, which is more often than 
not, a lawyer should be consulted. My claim, in contrast, is that the 
lawyer should serve only as a consultant; one of many other consult-
ants on matters of security, foreign policy, domestic policy, inter-
governmental policy, etc. The Bush administration, in effect, trans-
ferred the decision-making responsibility to the lawyers. Lawyers were 
often the first to be consulted, before even the subject-area experts.26 
And again, contrary to what might be thought, it is often not the 
                                                                                                                      
24 Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
Mich. L. Rev. 676, 748–58 (2005). 
25 Posner and Vermeuele reject Katyal’s proposals as overly rigid and even utopian. In-
stead, they propose bi-partisanship appointments to the OLC. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 897–909 (2007). 
26 See Remarks of Michael Chertoff at Harvard Alumni Reunion, Oct. 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/class-reunions/past-reunions/fall-2008/fall2008media. html. 
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lawyers who infuse themselves into the decision-making process, but 
instead the decision-maker that de facto delegates the decision-
making power to the lawyer, thus shirking responsibility. 
 Third, it is not that law should not matter or not matter much; it 
should matter a great deal and we must have a strong, though 
rebuttable, presumption in favor of operating within the law. It is 
because I have a deep respect for the law that I believe that the 
dialogue between the government and its lawyers should be free from 
the risk of making lawyers decision-makers. Lawyers should express 
their view of the law, together with relevant considerations of politics, 
morality, and strategy, without fearing that their decision will be taken 
by the decision-maker as the final word. For social, moral, security, 
and political decisions, we elected a government. It is the latter that 
should make the decisions and face the consequences. 
